For thousands of years, code-makers and code-breakers have been competing for supremacy. Their arsenals may soon include a powerful new weapon: quantum mechanics.
Cryptography -the art of code-making -has a long history of military and diplomatic applications, dating back to the Babylonians. In World World Two, the Allies' feat of breaking the legendary German code, Enigma, contributed greatly to the final Allied victory. Nowadays, cryptography is becoming increasingly important in commercial applications for electronic business and electronic commerce. Sensitive data such as credit card numbers and personal identification numbers (PINs) are routinely transmitted in encrypted form. Quantum mechanics is a new tool for both code-breakers and code-makers in their eternal arms race. It has the potential to revolutionize cryptography both by creating perfectly secure codes and by breaking standard encryption schemes.
The most well-known application of cryptography is secure communication [1] . Suppose Alice would like to send a message to Bob, but there is an eavesdropper, Eve, who is wiretapping the channel. To prevent Eve from knowing the message, Alice and Bob may perform encryption, i.e., transform the message to something that is not intelligible to Eve during the communication. On receiving the message, Bob inverts the transformation and recovers the message (see figure 1 ).
Bob's advantage over Eve lies in his knowledge of a secret, commonly called the key, that he shares with Alice. The key tells him how to decode the message. For example:
The rumble of Soviet tanks shook the Prague hotel room (number 117) as secret agent John Blond finished decoding his orders from his superior N. He tore the used page from the codebook and immediately burned it with his lighter.
Blond is using a perfectly unbreakable cipher, a "one-time pad." The secret codebook allows N and Blond to share a long secret binary string -the key -before Blond leaves on his mission. Whenever N would like to send a message to Blond, she first converts it to binary. She then takes the exclusive-OR (XOR) between each bit of the message and the corresponding key bit to generate the encrypted message, which is transmitted in a public channel. The KGB can intercept the encrypted message, but without the key, it is incomprehensible gibberish, offering no clue to the contents of the original message. On the other hand, Blond, by looking up the key in the codebook, can recover the original message by taking the XOR between the encrypted message and the key. Blond immediately burns the used page of the codebook to prevent it from falling into the hands of the KGB in the future.
Key Distribution Problem
John Blond finally snapped shut the codebook and sighed. He had been on duty in Czechoslovakia for so long that his codebook was getting thin. He knew his days in Prague would soon be over: N would have to recall him before he used up his whole codebook. Blond recalled master cryptographer R's remonstration: "This is no joking matter, double-one seven. Never re-use the one-time pad." R was serious for a good reason. The reuse of keys by the Soviet Union (due to the manufacturer's accidental duplication of one-time-pad pages) enabled US cryptanalysts to unmask the atomic spy Klaus Fuchs in 1949 [2] . When the key for a one-time pad is used more than once, enemy cryptanalysts have the opportunity to look for patterns in the encrypted messages which might reveal the key. Nevertheless, excellent cryptosystems (known as symmetric cryptosystems) have been developed that reuse the key. The longer the key, the more secure the system. For instance, a widely-used system is the Data Encryption Standard (DES), which has a key length of 56 bits. No method substantially more efficient than trying all 2 56 values of the key is known for breaking DES. It is still conceivable, however, that some yet unknown clever algorithm could defeat DES and its cousins.
For top secret applications, therefore, the one-time pad is preferable. Blond's predicament illustrates the drawback of the one-time pad: when the secret key is used up, the code cannot be used until the sender and receiver get together to share a new secret key. Sending a courier with a new codebook into the Prague Spring is a dangerous and unreliable business. Even if the courier arrives, Blond and N can never be sure that the codebook was not copied by the KGB during its journey.
This issue is known as the "key distribution problem." A possible solution is public key cryptography. Instead of a single long key shared between the sender and receiver, public key cryptography uses two sorts of keys: one public key, which is known to the world, and one private key, known only to the receiver. Anyone with the public key can send secret messages, but only someone who knows the private key can read them. The important defining feature of public key cryptography is that, even knowing the encryption key, there is no known computationally efficient way of working out what the decryption key really is. As an example, the security of the most well-known public key crypto-system, RSA, relies on the difficulty of factoring large integers (see figure 2) .
Public key cryptography can be used for another important task: digital signatures. A digital signature exchanges the role of the keys used in public key cryptography: the private key is used to generate a signature, and the public key is used to verify it. Only someone with the private key could have created the signature.
Quantum Code-breaking
Both DES and RSA rely on an unproven assumption: there is no fast algorithm to determine the secret key. For instance, RSA is believed to be secure because mathematicians throughout the world have worked very hard to break it, steadily producing modest improvements in factoring algorithms, but without groundbreaking success. By only modest increases in key size, users of RSA can easily keep ahead even of the exponential growth in computing power over the years.
Quantum mechanics changed this. In 1994, Peter Shor of AT&T invented a quantum algorithm for efficient factoring of large numbers [3] . The state of a quantum computer is a superposition of exponentially many basis states, which correspond to the states of a classical computer of the same size. By taking advantage of interference and entanglement in this system, a quantum computer can perform in a reasonable time some tasks that would take ridiculously long on a classical computer. Shor's discovery propelled the then obscure subject of quantum computing into a dynamic and rapidly developing field, and stimulated scores of experiments and proposals aimed towards building quantum computers.
Another remarkable discovery was made by Lov Grover who in 1996 invented a quantum searching algorithm [4] . To find one particular item among N objects requires checking O(N ) items classically. With Grover's algorithm, a quantum computer need only look up items O √ N times. It can be used to radically speed up the exhaustive key search of DES (i.e., trying all 2 56 possibilities). If a quantum computer is ever constructed in the future, much of conventional cryptography will fall apart! The key lengths of symmetric schemes like DES would have to be doubled due to Grover's algorithm. The most commonlyused public key schemes are RSA and classes based on discrete logarithms or elliptic curves; Shor's algorithm breaks all of them. Even if it is decades until a sufficiently large quantum computer can be built, this is a matter of current concern: some data, such as nuclear weapons designs, must still remain secret then, and it is important that today's secret messages cannot be decoded tomorrow.
Quantum Code-making
Even if DES and RSA do fall apart, the one-time pad remains a perfectly unbreakable cipher even against a quantum computer. However, as discussed above, it has a serious catch -the key distribution problem: It presupposes that Alice and Bob share a key that is secret and as long as the message. There is no way to guarantee that in practice. Trusted couriers can be bribed or even intercepted without their knowledge. More generally, classical signals are distinguishable -an eavesdropper can reliably read the signals without changing them. Therefore, in classical physics there is nothing, in principle, to prevent an eavesdropper from wiretapping the key distribution channel passively.
Fortunately, quantum mechanics helps to make codes as well as break them. (See [5] and C. H. Bennett, "Quantum Information and Computation," Physics Today, Oct. 1995, p. 24.) The Heisenberg uncertainty principle dictates that it is fundamentally impossible to know the exact values of conjugate variables such as the momentum of a particle and its position. This apparent limitation imposed by quantum mechanics can be used as a powerful tool in catching eavesdroppers. The key idea is to use non-orthogonal quantum states to encode information. More concretely, the essence of quantum cryptography can be understood in a single question: given a single photon in one of four possible polarizations (vertical, horizontal, 45-degrees and 135-degrees), can one determine its polarization with certainty? Surprisingly, the answer is no. The rectilinear basis (the vertical and horizontal directions) is conjugate to the diagonal basis (at 45 and 135 degrees), so the Heisenberg uncertainty principle forbids us from simultaneously measuring both. More generally, experiments distinguishing non-orthogonal states, even if only partially reliable, will disturb the states.
The key distribution problem can be partially solved by quantum mechanics using the idea of quantum key distribution (QKD). The first and best-known protocol is usually called "BB84" because it was published in 1984 by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard [6] . (See box 1 for details.) In a prototypical quantum key distribution protocol, Alice sends some nonorthogonal quantum states to Bob, who makes some measurements. Then, by talking on the phone (which need not be secure), they decide if Eve has tampered with the quantum states. If not, they have a shared key, which is guaranteed to be secret. Note that Alice and Bob must share some authentication information to begin with: otherwise, Bob has no way to know that he is really talking to Alice on the phone, and not a clever mimic. The key generated by QKD can subsequently be used for both encryption and authentication, thus achieving two major goals in cryptography.
Experimental quantum key distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an active experimental subject. The first working experimental prototype was constructed in 1989 at IBM, Yorktown Box 1: BB84
In the most well-known quantum key distribution scheme, BB84, Alice sends Bob a sequence of photons, each independently prepared in one of four polarizations (horizontal, vertical, 45 degrees, or 135 degrees). For each photon, Bob randomly picks one of the two (rectilinear and diagonal) bases to perform a measurement. He keeps the measurement outcome secret. Now Alice and Bob publicly compare their bases. They keep only the polarization data for which they measured in the same basis. In the absence of errors and Eve, these data should agree. (They throw away the data for which their bases disagree.)
To test for tampering, they now choose a random subset of the remaining polarization data and publicly announce them. From there they can compute the error rate (i.e., the fraction of points where their values disagree). If the error rate is unreasonably high, above around say 10%, they throw away all the data (and perhaps try again later). If the error rate is acceptably small, they perform error correction and also "privacy amplification" to distill out a shorter string which will act as the secret key. These steps essentially ensure that their keys agree, are random, and are unknown to Eve.
Other quantum key distribution schemes have also been proposed. For example, Artur Ekert (of Oxford) proposed one based on quantum mechanically correlated (i.e., entangled) photons and using Bell inequalities as a check of security. In 1992, Charles Bennett of IBM proposed a simple quantum key distribution scheme (called B92) which uses only two non-orthogonal states.
Heights [7] . It transmitted quantum signals over 32 cm of free air. Since then, various groups including those led by Paul Townsend of BT, Jim Franson of John Hopkins University, Nicolas Gisin and Hugo Zbinden of the University of Geneva, and Richard Hughes of Los Alamos National Labs have made important contributions. A primary focus has been a series of impressive experiments over commercial optical fibers. The world record distance for QKD, at the time of writing, is about 50km [8] . One of the long distance experiment was performed by Los Alamos National Laboratories and is depicted in figure 3 .
Most experiments to date have used variants of either the BB84 or B92 schemes (see box 1), although recently three groups -one led by Paul Kwiat of Los Alamos, Gisin and Zbinden's group at Geneva, and a collaboration led by Anton Zeilinger of the University of Vienna and Harald Weinfurtur of the University of Munich -have independently implemented EPR-based protocols. In the BB84 and B92 schemes, typically a single-photon source is simulated using attenuated coherent states -on average, only a fraction of a photon is actually sent. When taken in conjunction with absorption in the fiber, only a small fraction of arriving laser pulses actually contain a photon. This does not interfere much with key distribution, since only the photons that reach Bob are used in the protocol. The key is generally encoded in either the polarization or the phase of the photon. Error rates in the photons actually received are usually a few percent.
For commercial applications in say a local area network environment, it is useful for a quantum cryptographic system to be integrated into a passive multi-user optical fiber network and its equipment to be miniaturized. Paul Townsend's group at BT (now of Corning) has done much work in this area [9] . As for point-to-point applications, the Geneva group has devised a so-called "plug and play" system which automatically compensates for polarization fluctuations [10] . Such systems might someday convey secret information between government agencies around Washington D.C., or connect bank branches within a city.
Quantum key distribution has also been performed in open air, during daylight, with a current range of about 1.6 km [11] . An even more ambitious proposal to perform a ground to satellite quantum key distribution experiment has been made by John Hopkins University and, more recently and in more detail, by Los Alamos National Laboratories. If successful, quantum cryptography may be used to ensure the security of command control of satellites from control centers on the ground.
Future experiments will aim to make quantum key distribution more reliable, to integrate it with today's communications infrastructure, and to increase the distance and rate of key generation. Another ambitious goal would be to produce a quantum repeater using techniques of quantum error correction. Such an accomplishment will require substantial technical breakthroughs, but would allow key distribution over arbitrarily long distances.
Is QKD Secure?
While experiments in quantum key distribution forged ahead, the theory developed more slowly. A clever Eve can adopt many possible strategies to fool Alice and Bob, including subtle quantum attacks entangling all of the particles sent by Alice. Taking all possibilities into account, as well as the effects of realistic imperfections in Alice and Bob's apparatus and channel, has been very difficult. A long series of partial results by many people has appeared over the years, addressing restricted sets of strategies by Eve [12] , but only in the past few years have complete proofs appeared.
One class of proofs, by Dominic Mayers [13] and subsequently others [14] attack the problem directly, and prove the security of the standard BB84 protocol. Another approach, by one of us (HKL) and H. F. Chau [15] , instead proves the security of a new protocol using quantum error-correcting codes [5] . (For information on quantum error correction, see J. Preskill, "Battling Decoherence: The Fault-Tolerant Quantum Computer", Physics Today, June 1999, p. 24.) This approach allows one to apply classical probability theory to tackle a quantum problem directly. It works because the relevant observables under consideration all commute with each other. While conceptually simpler, this protocol requires a quantum computer to implement. The two classes of approaches have been unified by Peter Shor and John Preskill [16] , who showed that a quantum code protocol could be modified to become BB84 without compromising its security.
The proof of the security of QKD is a fine theoretical result, but it does not mean that a real QKD system would be secure [17] . Some known and unknown security loopholes might prove to be fatal. Apparently minor quirks of a system can sometimes provide a lever for an eavesdropper to break it. For instance, instead of producing a single photon, the laser may produce two; Eve can keep one and give the other to Bob. She can then learn what polarization Alice sent without revealing her presence. There are various possible solutions to this particular problem; it is the unanticipated flaws that present the greatest security hazard. Ultimately, we cannot have confidence that a real-life quantum cryptographic system is secure until it has stood up to attacks from determined real-life adversaries. Traditionally, breaking cryptographic protocols has been regarded as important as making them -the protocols that survive are more likely to be truly secure. The same standard will have to be applied to quantum key distribution.
Post-Cold-War Applications
There are many problems beyond secure communication that can be addressed by cryptography.
Alice and Bob are considering going on a date, but neither is willing to admit their interest unless the other is also interested. How can they decide whether or not to date without letting slip any unnecessary information?
This dating problem can be phrased as the problem of computing a function f (a, b) = ab, where a and b are single bits held by Alice and Bob (0 = not interested, 1 = interested). Problems like this can be solved classically using variants of public key cryptography, which we know might be rendered insecure by quantum computers. By exchanging quantum states, can Alice and Bob solve the above dating problem with absolute security?
There are many possible functions f that two people might wish to compute together, too many to address all of them individually. Instead, cryptographers rely on a suite of primitive operations that can be composed to build more complex functions. One important protocol is called bit commitment, and it is the electronic equivalent of a locked box: Alice chooses a bit, 0 or 1, and writes it on a piece of paper, which she deposits in the box. She gives the box to Bob, but keeps the key. She cannot change what she wrote, and without the key, Bob cannot open the box, but at some later point, Alice can give Bob the key and reveal her bit. By itself, bit commitment is useful mostly for debunking professional psychics, but it serves as a useful building block for more interesting functions.
Consider the following bit commitment scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard [6] : if Alice wishes to commit to a 0, she sends Bob a polarized photon in the rectilinear basis; if she wishes to commit to a 1, she sends Bob a polarized photon in the diagonal basis. In either case, Alice flips a coin to decide which of the two polarizations to send. Bob has no way to tell which basis Alice used -either way, his state is perfectly random. When Alice unveils her bit, she tells Bob which of the four states she used. Then Bob can measure in the appropriate basis to verify that Alice is telling the truth. If she lies about which basis she used, Bob has a 50% chance of finding out. If the protocol is repeated many times, Alice's chance of successfully cheating is abysmally small. This protocol is secure against a classical cheater, who does not have much ability to store and manipulate quantum states. But as Bennett and Brassard recognized, a quantum cheater can break the protocol. Suppose, instead of picking a specific state and sending it to Bob, Alice instead creates an entangled pair of photons, (|HV − |V H )/ √ 2 (this is also called an Einstein-PodolskyRosen, or EPR, pair), and sends the second photon to Bob, keeping the first one. She stores the quantum state of the first photon and delays measuring it. Suppose that when the time comes for Alice to open the commitment, she decides she would like the committed bit to read 0, which requires her to specify a state in the rectilinear basis. Alice knows that if she and Bob measure in the same basis, they will get opposite results. Therefore, she can measure her photon in the rectilinear basis and tell Bob he has the opposite polarization, and she will always be right.
If Alice instead wishes the committed bit to read 1, she needs a state in the diagonal basis. But
She measures her particle in the diagonal basis, and can again be sure that Bob's measurement outcome will be opposite to hers. Quantum cheating allows Alice to change her mind at the last minute without being caught by Bob, thus totally defeating the purpose of bit commitment. Nonetheless, more sophisticated schemes for quantum bit commitment were proposed, and for a long time were believed to be secure. Eventually, the bubble burst and it was shown that the quantum cheating strategy discussed abovewhich uses the EPR effect and delayed measurements -can be generalized to break all two-party quantum bit commitment schemes [18] : If Alice and Bob hold one of two pure quantum states which are indistinguishable to Bob, then Alice, acting unilaterally, can change one to the other. Therefore, the two basic requirements of bit commitment -that Bob does not know the bit and that Alice cannot change it -are fundamentally incompatible with quantum mechanics.
The strength of the proof lies in its generality. The idea is to treat the whole system as if it were quantum mechanical, extending the part that was originally quantum to include any dice, measuring devices, and classical computation that appear in the protocol. For this point of view, the original protocol is equivalent to a purely quantum one, with some of the outputs being thrown in the trash (see figure 4) . Note that throwing something away can never help a cheater, so we might as well assume that the state shared by Alice and Bob is completely determined by the protocol -it is a pure quantum state, such as an EPR pair. That substantially reduces the complexity of the problem; it is not difficult to Box 2: Glossary B92 a quantum key distribution scheme using two nonorthogonal states.
BB84 a quantum key distribution scheme. See box 1.
cryptanalysis the art of code-breaking cryptography the art of code-making Data Encryption Standard (DES) a US federal standard symmetric encryption scheme for unclassified but sensitive data.
key a random string of numbers employed in encryption or decryption one-time pad a perfectly secure encryption scheme in which the key is as long as the message and never re-used.
private key a decryption key that is kept secret.
public key an encryption key that is publicly announced.
public key cryptography see figure 2 .
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) scheme see figure 2 quantum key distribution (QKD) a scheme based on quantum mechanics that allows two users to share a common string of secret numbers.
symmetric cryptosystem a cryptographic system with the same private key for both encryption and decryption.
show that when Alice and Bob hold a pure state, quantum bit commitment is impossible. Following the fall of quantum bit commitment, other important basic quantum cryptographic protocols have also been proven to be insecure by one of us (HKL), thus leaving the field in shambles. What is left? Some problems are too similar to bit commitment, and cannot be done at all.
Other problems have more modest goals, and can be solved by quantum protocols. For instance, Lior Goldenberg, Lev Vaidman, and Stephen Wiesner of Tel Aviv University have proposed a method of "quantum gambling," where a cheater must pay a large fine whenever he is caught. The majority of problems lie in a middle ground -we do not know whether or not they are possible. The dating problem is an example. Many approaches to it tread too near bit commitment, and are doomed to failure, but it's possible there are others, as yet undiscovered, which do not.
Physics Today, Cryptology Tomorrow
Quantum computers are still on the drawingboards, and quantum cryptography systems are only prototypes. Still, there are a number of reasons for thinking about quantum cryptology today. Unlike other cryptosystems, the security of quantum key distribution is based on fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, rather than unproven computational assumptions. QKD eliminates the great threat of unanticipated advances in algorithms and hardware breaking a widely-used cryptosystem. Small-scale QKD systems are well within the capabilities of today's technology, and commercial systems could be available within a few years (although whether such systems are widely adopted depends on many non-academic factors such as cost. For further discussion, see H.-K. Lo, quant-ph/9912011).
Furthermore, grappling with the problems posed by quantum protocols can give us insight into more general questions about quantum mechanical systems in many fields of physics. For instance, one reason it is hard to analyze protocols and attacks is that they frequently involve a combination of quantum and classical behaviors. In considering bit commitment in the last section, it was possible to replace classical parts of the protocol with a quantum description, an approach which is useful for many problems inside and outside the field of quantum cryptography. It is sometimes called the Church of the Larger Hilbert Space, following John Smolin of IBM -all quantum operations, including measurements, are unitary when considered as acting on a larger Hilbert space ( figure 4) .
Finally, quantum mechanics changes the world of cryptology, and it is important to know what the new terrain will look like in order to decide on cryptographic standards that may last for decades. In a world where quantum computers and communication are commonplace, today's most widespread public key cryptosystems would no longer work; in the worst case, perhaps no public key cryptosystem will work. If so, symmetric cryptosystems and quantum key distribution would partially fill the gap, allowing secure communication. Unfortunately, digital signatures would fail as well, meaning important communications would need to be notarized by a trusted third party.
Of course, quantum key distribution and symmetric cryptosystems are not useful in situations when Alice and Bob have never met before. Solving this problem would probably require a quantum cryptographic center, which could verify the identity of both of them. The center would have to be known and trusted by both Alice and Bob.
Problems beyond secret communication and digital signatures are a mixed bag. Many, such as bit commitment and perhaps the dating problem, would be impossible, whereas others, such as quantum gambling, could be carried out with complete security. This is just one of a number of possible futures: perhaps some new or existing public key cryptosystems will survive quantum computation, or perhaps there will be new public key systems that can only run on a quantum computer. Perhaps quantum computers will always remain difficult to build (we believe Box 3: Decoding the message in Figure 1 The code is a "Caesar's cipher," where each letter is shifted by a fixed number of places in the alphabet. In this case, the shift is three places. that this is unlikely), and public key cryptography will remain widespread, despite its potential flaws. Only time will tell who benefits more from quantum cryptology: the code-makers or the code-breakers. The RSA public key crypto-system: The most well-known public-key system is called RSA, after its inventors Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman. It is based on modular arithmetic over a large base N , which is the product of two large primes p and q. If x is relatively prime to N , the EulerFermat theorem tells us that x r ≡ 1 mod N , where r = (p−1)(q−1). The public key is a pair of numbers (N, e), and the private key is d, with ed ≡ 1 mod r (i.e., ed = kr + 1 for some integer k). To encrypt a message m, a sender Alice computes y ≡ m e mod N . To decrypt the message y, the receiver Bob computes [8] , which implements the B92 two-state protocol. The laser with wavelength 1.3 µm is first attenuated to approximate a single-photon source, which will ultimately produce the key bits. The signal generated is then passed through Alice's interferometer. The two nonorthogonal states of the B92 protocol are realized as two possible settings for the phase delay, φ A , in one branch of the interferometer. To measure the state, Bob passes the photon through his own interferometer, adding one of two possible phase shifts, φ B , and detects the photon in one of the two cooled detectors, depending on the choice of both φ A and φ B . The room temperature detector looks for a bright pulse from a second laser with wavelength 1.55 µm, which tells Bob when to expect a photon from Alice. Air gaps in both interferometers are used for adjustments to keep Alice and Bob properly synchronized. b) Photo of the Los Alamos experiment. Each signal originates with Alice's computer, passes through the 48 km of optical fiber, and returns to Bob's computer, just next to Alice's. (Figure courtesy of Los Alamos National Labs.) Figure 4 : The Church of the Larger Hilbert Space. The most general operation compatible with quantum mechanics, including measurement and generating random numbers, can be described using three steps. First, augment the system with an additional system. Second, perform a unitary transformation involving the original system and the new system. Third, throw away some of the outputs. This picture applies equally well to a long series of operations, which can all be pushed into the second step of unitary transformations. This step is purely quantum, allowing us to delay the complications of measurement until the end of the evolution. In the figure, the horizontal lines represent the paths of elementary quantum subsystems, such as two-level quantum bits ("qubits"), which enter on the left and interact via the unitary transformation U .
